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Recent Developments 
Strickler v. Greene 
Reasonable Probability that Disclosure of Withheld Evidence Would Have Led to 
a Different Outcome at Trial Is Required to Obtain Relief under the Brady Rule 
The United States Supreme Court held that to establish 
a constitutional violation under Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
there must be a reasonable probability 
that disclosure of evidence withheld 
by the prosecution would have 
changed the outcome of the trial. 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 
119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999). Affirming a 
decision in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the 
Court held that although the petitioner 
demonstrated cause for failure to raise 
a timely claim, and satisfied two of the 
three elements of a Brady violation, 
petitioner failed to establish material 
prejudice sufficient to obtain relief. 
In January 1990, Leanne 
Whitlock ("Whitlock'') was abducted 
from a Virginia shopping mall, robbed, 
and brutally murdered. The murder 
weapon was a sixty-nine pound rock 
that was dropped on her head. Given 
the weight of the rock, forensic 
evidence suggested that two people 
had committed the murder; one by 
holding Whitlock down, the other by 
dropping the rock that crushed her 
skull. Police arrested and charged 
Tommy Strickler ("Strickler") and 
Ronald Henderson ("Henderson'') for 
the three offenses. During separate 
trials, the prosecutor presented 
evidence from the murder scene, 
Whitlock's abandoned car, and 
eyewitness accounts linking both 
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defendants to the crime. One essential 
eyewitness, Anne Stoltzfus 
("Stoltzfus") provided the only 
narrative account of what transpired 
during the abduction. Claiming she 
possessed "an exceptional memory," 
Stoltzfus confidently described in vivid 
detail the aggressive and dominant role 
Strickler played, portraying him as the 
one who had initiated and directed the 
abduction. 
Although both defendants were 
found guilty, Henderson was 
convicted of the lesser offense of first-
degree murder, while Strickler was 
convicted of capital murder and 
sentenced to death. The Virginia 
Supreme Court affirmed Strickler's 
conviction and sentence. After 
appointing new counsel to represent 
Strickler during state habeas corpus 
proceedings, the circuit court 
dismissed the petition and the state 
supreme court affirmed. During each 
state proceeding, Strickler's attorney 
relied on the prosecutor's open file 
policy, believing the files contained all 
information in possession of, and 
known to, the state. 
In 1996, Strickler filed a federal 
habeas corpus petition in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia The district court 
granted Strickler's ex parte petition 
to obtain all files that were relevant to 
his case. While examining these 
documents, Strickler's attorney 
discovered previously undisclosed 
notes taken from interviews between 
a police detective and Stoltzfus, which 
the attorney concluded could have 
significantly impeached Stoltzfus's 
credibility. A comparison of her 
testimony and the documents would 
have revealed the disparity between 
Stoltzfus's detailed description of the 
violent abduction, and her previously 
''vague memory" of the same incident 
that she ''totally wrote [] off as a trivial 
episode of college kids carrying on." 
Strickler contended that because the 
documents contained critical 
exculpatory and impeaching evidence 
that was withheld from defense 
counsel, the resulting Brac6;violation 
rendered his conviction 
constitutionally invalid 
The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of 
Strickler, holding that the 
prosecution's failure to disclose the 
documents amounted to prejudice 
sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the verdict. However, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court, holding that the Brady claim 
was procedurally flawed because 
Strickler failed to raise it during state 
proceedings. Alternatively, the court 
of appeals held that the evidence 
would not have materially affected 
Strickler's conviction or sentence. 
The United States Supreme Court 
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granted certiorari to determine: 1) 
whether there was a Brady violation; 
2) whether there was sufficient cause 
for the procedural default by raising 
the Brady claim; and 3) whether the 
undisclosed evidence prejudiced 
Strickler's right to a fair trial. 
The Supreme Court began its 
analysis with a discussion of the 
essential elements of a Brady violation. 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at __ , 119 S. 
Ct. at 1948. TheBradyrulerequires 
the prosecution to disclose all 
evidence favorable to an accused, 
where that evidence is material to 
either guilt or punishment. Id (citing 
Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87). 
The ,rule encompasses both 
exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence known to anyone acting on 
behalf of the government that has been 
withheld either purposefully or 
inadvertently, regardless of whether it 
was requested. Id (citing United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676 
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419,437 (1995». The Court noted 
that a true Brady violation does not 
result, however, unless the accused 
establishes prejudice by meeting the 
"reasonable probability" standard that 
suppressed evidence would have 
produced a different verdict had it 
been disclosed to the defense. Id 
The Supreme Court held that in 
the instant case, two of the three 
essential elements of a Brady violation, 
the prosecution's failure to disclose 
documents to the defense, and the 
impeaching character of that evidence, 
were "unquestionably established." 
Id. The Court was also satisfied that 
Strickler showed cause sufficient to 
excuse the procedural default. Id. at 
_, 119 S. Ct. at 1952. The Court 
stated that by relying on the 
prosecutor's open file policy, 
Strickler was justified in believing the 
file would contain everything known 
to the state. Id. 
In narrowing the issue to 
whether Strickler satisfied the 
"materiality" element of Brady, the 
Court noted that "without a doubt," 
Stoltzfus's testimony made Strickler's 
conviction "more likely than not," 
without which the outcome of the trial 
"might have" been different. Id. To 
obtain relief, however, the Court 
reiterated the correct standard as 
being a "reasonable probability" of a 
different outcome, and not a "more 
likely than not" standard. Id. The 
question, thus, was whether the 
"favorable evidence could reasonably 
be taken to put the whole case in such 
a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict." Id. 
(quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435). 
Applying this standard to the facts of 
the case, the Supreme Court held that 
Strickler failed to satisfy his burden. 
Id. at _, 119 S. Ct. at 1955. 
Although a "reasonable possibility" 
of a different outcome existed, 
Strickler's burden was to establish a 
"reasonableprobabi/ity." Id. at_, 
119 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 434). 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Souter parted company with the 
majority, concluding that Strickler mid 
satisfied his burden with respect to the 
sentence. Id at _, 119 S. Ct. at 
1956. Reiterating that the materiality 
analysis does not end at the conviction 
stage, he maintained that there was a 
reasonable probability that 
impeachment of Stoltzfus' s testimony 
would have swayed at least one juror 
away from recommending the death 
sentence. Id During the sentencing 
phase, Justice Souter reasoned, it was 
likely that Stoltzfus's testimony 
portraying Strickler as the ringleader 
influenced the jury's assessmentofhis 
future dangerousness. Id. at ---' 119 
S. Ct. at 1960. 
Justice Souter emphasized that 
the continued use of the shorthand 
term "reasonable probability" creates 
the risk of confusing the correct 
standard. Id. at _, 119 S. Ct. at 
1956. Suggesting "significant 
possibility" as a better standard, 
Justice Souter opined that this 
alternative would more clearly 
demonstrate the degree to which 
undisclosed evidence actually 
undermined a verdict or sentence. Id. 
at_, 119 S. Ct. at 1957. 
With its decision in Strickler v. 
Greene, the United States Supreme 
Court has firmly established the 
standard for obtaining relief under 
Brady as a "reasonable probability" 
that the outcome would be different. 
Although the Court stresses the 
special role of prosecutors to ensure 
justice through truth, the use of this 
ambiguous nomenclature leaves little 
promise for the truly innocent in the 
face of an erroneous decision. 
Likewise, the application of this vague 
standard during the sentencing phase 
could mean the difference between life 
and death. 
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